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DANIEL C.K. CHOW *
David Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis have written a useful, concise
overview of the World Trade Organization (WTO)1 dispute settlement
process. This book will be valuable as both a reference and a handbook to
lawyers, government officials, and diplomats appearing in cases before the
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO. Both authors
have considerable experience in this field-one is an experienced practitioner
in representing clients before the WTO and its predecessor organization, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 and the other is a former
official with the Legal Affairs Division of WTO and GATT who has advised
numerous dispute settlement panels.3
With the exception of the first chapter setting forth the background of the
WTO and GATT, the chapters in this book correspond with each of the
phases of the dispute settlement process4 -the initiation of the complaint, 5
the work of the dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body,6 the
implementation by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of final reports, 7 and
remedies. 8 The content of each chapter tracks the relevant provisions of
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A., J.D., Yale
University. Thanks to Dean Gregory H. Williams for his continuing support.
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
Legal Instruments-RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATTI.
3 DAVID PALMETER & PETRoS C. MAvRoIDIs, DisPuTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 315 (1999).
4 The WTO eschews the terms "dispute resolution" preferring the less litigious
sounding "dispute settlement."
5 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at chs. 2-3.
6Id at chs. 4-6.
7 Id at ch. 7.
8 Id. at ch. 8.
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major treaties, agreements, or internal working procedures of the WTO, with
useful footnote references to original sources. A few of the chapters go into
detail about technical issues and specialized aspects of the dispute settlement
process, reflecting the authors' experience in areas in which problems will
likely arise. In its appendices, the book contains an exclusive list (but not the
texts) of the following: (1) WTO Appellate Body reports;9 (2) the WTO
Panel Reports;10 (3) WTO Arbitrator's Reports; 1" (4) GATT Reports; 12 and,
(5) decisions from other relevant sources. 13 In addition, this book contains
the texts of all the major WTO agreements and other applicable instruments,
including the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 14 Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
and relevant selections of other WTO substantive agreements, such as the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 15 that create
specialized treatment for dispute settlement. 16 The authors' clear exegesis of
the dispute settlement process outlined in the text combined with a collection
of the reports, agreements, references, and documents make this work a
useful reference for those involved in VTO dispute settlement.
Although the volume does not purport to be a scholarly work (aimed
instead at those working in the field), it does develop and demonstrate a
major thesis: the evolution of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process
from an informal process reflecting the diplomatic roots of GATT17 to a
more formal legal structure that takes on institutional features of an
adversarial process similar to that of civil litigation in the United States. This
is a topic that should be followed by both practitioners and scholars alike as
the WTO dispute settlement system continues to evolve further in the
9 Id. at 177-78.
10 Id. at 178-79.
11 Id. at 179.
12 Id. at 177-78.
13 Id. at 181-82.
14 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], reprinted in
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 187-218.
15 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27.
16 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 219-306.
17
'Originally the process was called "conciliation" not dispute settlement.
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direction of civil litigation. The authors show that the new WTO dispute
settlement system marks a new era of legalism for the WTO and for
international trade, one that will likely continue as international commerce-
and the inevitable disputes that arise-becomes an increasingly important
feature of the world economy. This theme, and how this book develops it, is
further examined and discussed below.
I. BACKGROUND OF =HE WTO, GATT, AND ITO18
To understand the evolution and development of the WTO dispute
settlement process, it is useful to trace the history of the WTO and GATT, its
predecessor organization. When it became clear that the Allies would defeat
Germany and Japan in World War II, the United States and other nations
turned to the task of rebuilding nations and economic systems in ruins after a
period of immense destruction and suffering. 19 Many believed that the
economic policies of isolationism and protectionist trade policies and the
resulting chaos and misery that such policies inflicted on other nations
contributed to the mutual distrust and hostilities that eventually plunged
almost the entire world into war.20 World leaders were committed to
establishing international economic organizations that would prevent nations
from once again adopting such disastrous economic policies in the post-war
era.21 These concerns eventually led to the Bretton Woods Conference in
New Hampshire in 1944, which helped to establish the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (generally known as the World Bank) and
the International Monetary Fund, two organizations that would play an
important stabilizing role in the post-war global economy.22 These two
organizations focused their work on monetary issues, however, and the
United States perceived a need for a third organization to deal with trade
issues.23 After Bretton Woods, the United States submitted a proposal for the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which would serve as a foundation
for the post-war international trade system, but the plan for the ITO was too
ambitious for the times.24 Eventually, the proposal for the ITO would meet
18 This section is based upon Chapter 1 of PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3.
19 PALMTR & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 1.
20 Id
21 See id.
22 Id. at 1-2.
23 See id at 2.
24Id.
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its demise at the hands of the United States Senate, which on December 6,
1950, refused to approve the ITO charter.25
The ITO was intended to be comprehensive, with plans to encompass
within its scope not only trade, but issues concerning labor and employment,
commodities, economic development, and restrictive business practices. 26
None of the other parts of the ITO survived, but GATT, an agreement
dealing with trade issues, did survive. As other parts of the ITO were being
drafted, a drafting committee was able to complete the full text of GATT in
January and February 1947.27 "From April through October 1947, the
members of the [ITO] Preparatory Committee conducted a round of tariff
negotiations" among 25 nations in the European Office of the ITO.28 -The
conclusion of this round, the first of eight rounds, resulted in the text of
GATT and an agreed upon schedule of tariffs. 29 GATT itself was originally
viewed as a treaty only to be part of the fTO, but the parties did not want to
wait for the ITO to be established before GATT became effective and
entered into the Protocol of Provision Application, making GATT effective
as of January 1, 1948.30 Because the ITO never came into existence, GATT's
provisional application lasted for 47 years until the establishment of the
WTO in 1995.31 However, the importance of GATT to international
commerce led to successive negotiating rounds dealing with a variety of
separate issues, including tariff cuts (Annecy, Torquay, Geneva, and Dillon
Rounds) and non-tariff barriers (Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds).32 The most
recent round, the Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986-1994, was the
longest and involved the largest number of participating countries with 128
parties.33 Dealing with dispute settlement was one of the major goals of the
Uruguay Round, and the resulting agreement that was reached, the DSU, is
regarded as one the major achievements of the Round.34
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2-3.
27 Id. at3.
28 Id.
29 Id. at3.
30 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
31 Id. at2.
3 2 Id. at5.
33 See id.
3 4 See id. at7.
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II. DisPum SETTLEMENT UNDER GAIT 35
Dispute settlement practice under GATT developed based upon GATT
Articles XXII and XXIII and the principles established under these articles
continue to serve as the basis for dispute resolution under the DSU.36 While
neither of these articles sets forth any detailed procedures on dispute
settlement, these articles do set forth some substantial obligations on the part
of contracting parties to provide opportunities for the airing and
consideration of complaints of conduct inconsistent with GATT.37 Under
Article XXII:1, contracting parties are required to "afford other parties
adequate opportunit[ies] for consultation with respect to any matter arising
out of the operation" of GATT.38 Under this provision, a contracting party
dissatisfied with the policies, practices, or any other matter arising out of
another contracting party's obligations under GATT had the right to bilateral
consultations with the latter.39 When such consultations fail to resolve the
dispute, the complaining party is authorized by Article XXIII:2 to refer the
matter to the contracting parties, which will then consult with both of the
parties. to the dispute. Under Article XXIII: 1, "if any contracting party
considers [a] benefit directly or indirectly" provided by GATT to have been
"nullified or impaired by another party, [the complaining party] can make
written representations or proposals to [the] other party."40 If this does not
satisfactorily resolve the matter, "the complaining party is authorized [under]
Article XXIII:2 to refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, who are
required to investigate the matter and make appropriate recommendations on
its settlement."41 Under certain circumstances, the contracting parties can.
recommend that the complaining party suspend or withdraw tariff
concessions or other benefits to the party who has engaged in conduct
inconsistent with GATT obligations. 42
Specific procedures on dispute settlement evolved over time. In practice,
GAIT dispute settlement was conducted through the use of panels that
35 This section is based upon Chapter 1, § 1.01(5) of PALMETER & MAVROIDIS,
supra note 3.
36 DSU, supra note 15, at art. 3.1, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note
3, at 188.
37 See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 8.
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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would hold two or three formal meetings with the parties.43 The panel would
invite the parties to submit written memoranda on issues related to the
dispute.44 In a procedure resembling a hearing, the panel invited the parties
to present their views either in writing or orally and in the presence of each
other.45 The panel could then question the parties. Panels also heard the
views of any contracting party having an interest in the matter, could consult
with any outside source they considered relevant, and could obtain the views
of experts on technical issues relevant to the dispute.46 At the conclusion of
its deliberations, the panel would issue a report containing a recommendation
on how the dispute should be resolved, including recommendations on how a
party can bring an offending measure into conformity with GATT.47
A. The Principle of Consensus
Reflecting its nature as a multi-lateral treaty and its diplomatic roots,
GATT required that every action affecting the treaty be consented to by all of
the parties.48 In practice, this meant that a losing party to the dispute must
consent to the adoption of the panel report that is adverse to its interests and
that failure to consent would block the adoption of the report. Indeed, a party
could even block the very establishment of a panel if it anticipated that it
would ultimately lose the dispute and be faced with the diplomatic
embarrassment of having to block an adverse report.49 Reflecting the value
with which the contracting parties viewed the GATT system, parties
attempted to avoid blocking, and a study of GATT dispute settlement from
1947-1992 shows that the losing party eventually accepted the results of an
adverse panel report in about ninety percent of all cases.50 Nevertheless,
losing parties did sometimes block the establishment of a panel, the adoption
43 Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of
Dispute Settlement (Article XXII:2), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 215-18 (1980).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 40, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 341-42. Unless a treaty specifies otherwise, all action concerning the interpretation,
modification, and amendment of the treaty must receive the unanimous consent of all
contracting parties. Id.
49 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 9-10
5 0 Id. at 10 (citing ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 278
(1993)).
[Vol. 16:2 2001]
A NEW ERA OF LEGALISM
of adverse reports, and the threat of blocking also loomed in the background
of any GATT dispute settlement process.51 So long as the principle of
consensus continued to be applied to GATT disputes, blocking was a
problem-and indications in the 1980s were that blocking was occurring
with increasing frequency. The requirement of consensus in dispute
settlement had created issues that GATT members felt had to be addressed.
III. THE WTO AND TE PRINCIPLE OF "NEGATIVE" CONSENSUS 52
The problems caused by the principle of consensus led the parties to
adopt a series of interim rules during the Montreal round that were later
adopted on a permanent basis during the Uruguay Round and became part of
the WTO.53 One of the most significant features of the Montreal rules was
the new requirement that a panel must be established once a request is made
by a complaining party unless all parties vote not to establish a panel.54 In
other words, the principle of consensus had been changed from one of
"positive" consensus requiring the unanimous vote of all parties for the
establishment of a panel to a principle of "negative" consensus requiring the
unanimous vote of all parties not to establish a panel. 55 Since the
complaining party is one of the parties that must vote not to establish a panel,
there is no practical likelihood that a panel will not be established once the
complaining party makes such a request.56 This principle of negative
consensus, first established by the-Montreal rules, was extended by the
Uruguay Round to other aspects of the dispute settlement process, including
the adoption of panel reports and reports of the WTO Appellate Body, further
discussed below.57 This new principle of negative consensus has now
effectively resolved one of GATT's most sensitive and difficult issues in the
dispute settlement process: the diplomatic embarrassment of a losing party
blocking any actions that adversely affects its interests. The adoption of the
51 Id. at 10.
52 This section is based upon Chapter 1, § 1.04 of PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra
note 3.
5 3 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12,
1989, GATr B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1990).
54 Id.at 63.
55 Id. at 17.
56 See id.
57 See id.
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negative consensus principle also moves the WTO dispute settlement process
firmly in the direction of an adversarial civil litigation system. 58
IV. DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE WTO
The WTO was officially established on January 1, 1995 as the successor
to GATT and formally created by the Marakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, the culmination of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations begun in the summer of 1986.5 9 Unlike GATT, which was a
treaty and not an organization, the WTO is a permanent institution similar in
stature to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund established
by the Bretton Woods Agreement and serves as the foundation for the
modem international trade system, a role that was originally intended for the
ITO at the end of World War ]1. 60 One of the major achievements of the
Uruguay round is the Dispute Settlement Understanding, attached as annex 2
to the WTO agreement. The DSU sets forth the procedures governing dispute
settlement under the WTO, and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is the
institutional entity that was created under the DSU to deal with disputes
arising under any of the WTO agreements.
A. The Dispute Settlement Panels61
Although the DSB is empowered to resolve disputes under the WTO and
DSU agreements, these responsibilities are in practice discharged by the
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body, both of which function
like courts. 62 The reports of the dispute settlement panels and the Appellate
Body must be adopted by the DSB, but the principle of negative consensus
means that such adoption will almost automatically occur.63
At the preliminary stages of the dispute settlement process, the parties
have opportunities for the informal settlement of the dispute through
consultations64 and good offices or mediation. 65 Once the formal process
5 8 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 61.
59 Id. at 13.
60 See id. 13-15.
61 This section is based upon Chapter 4 of PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3.
62 Id. at 62.
63 Id. at 61-62.
64 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 62-65; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 4,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 190-92.
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begins, the parties undergo a process much like that of civil litigation in
which the dispute is first heard by a fact finding body and then reviewed by
an appellate tribunal that has a scope of review limited to issues of law.6 6
Under the WTO, the panels, composed of three to five individuals,67 will
consult with the parties and will establish a time-table for the proceedings,
including a schedule for written submissions and hearings.68 Written
submissions set forth the positions and arguments of the parties, similar to
legal briefs in civil litigation. Meetings6 9 are held in closed sessions with the
complaining party presenting its case first to the panel, which may at any
time interrupt with questions. The panel has flexibility in evaluating evidence
and can seek information and technical advice from any source.70 At the end
of the first session, the parties are allowed to make a second written
submission, which serves as a rebuttal submission directed at arguments by
the opposing side raised during the first hearing.71 At the request of a party,
the panel then convenes for a second meeting at which it considers the
rebuttal arguments raised by both sides. This is normally the last opportunity
for the parties to make their case to the panel.72
Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions, the panel issues the
descriptive portion (containing the facts and arguments of the parties) of its
draft report to the parties.73 After a period during which the parties are
allowed to comment on the draft, the panel then issues its interim report
containing the description as revised (if necessary) and the panel's findings
and conclusions. 74 The parties are allowed to comment on the draft final
report and request a further meeting with the panel on precise aspects of the
65 P AMMR & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 66; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 5,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 192-93.
66 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at arts. 11 and 17.
67 PALMETER & MArROIDIS, supra note 3, at 68; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 8.5,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 195.
68 PALMETR & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 72; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 12.3,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 197.
69 The DSU eschews the term "hearings."
70 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 76; DSU, supra note 14, at.art. 13.1,
reprinted in PALMErER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 199.
71 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 88; DSU, supra note 14, at app. 3, 7,
reprinted in PALMErER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 314.
7 2 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note'3, at 91.
73 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 91; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 15.1,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 200.
74 PALMETRu & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 91; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 15.2,
reprinted in PALMErER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 200.
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interim report.75 If no comments are received during the comment period, the
draft interim report becomes the panel's final report.76 The time of the initial
composition of the panel to the date that the final report is issued should not,
as a general rule, exceed six months.77 In urgent cases, the panel will strive to
issue a final report in three months.78 In no event, should the period from the
establishment of the panel to the issuance of the report to Members exceed
nine months.79
B. The Appellate Process8°
The introduction of a standing appellate body in the WTO dispute
settlement process appears to be unique under international law. Even the
International Court of Justice is a court of original jurisdiction that decides
issues of law and fact and from which no appeal is possible. With the
Appellate Body, the WTO now has a fact-finding body and an appellate
review tribunal, features common in domestic civil litigation systems.
The Appellate Body is established by the DSB and consists of seven
persons, three of whom can serve on any one case.81 The Appellate Body
may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a panel
but may not remand the case with directions to the panel. Under the
Appellate Body's rules, 82 oral argument must be held in each case within
thirty days of the Notice of Appeal, 83 and the Appellate Body normally must
75 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 91; DSU, supra note 14, at app. 3,
12, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 215.
76 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 92; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 15.2,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 200.
77 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 93; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 12.8,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 198.
7 8 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 12.8, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra
note 3, at 198.
79 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 93; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 12.9,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 198.
80 This section is based upon Chapter 6 of PALMETER & MAvROIDIS, supra note 3.
81 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 135; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 17.1,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 201.
82 The DSU provides that the Appellate Body shall draw up its own working
procedures. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 136; DSU, supra note 14, at art.
17.9, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 202. These procedures are
contained in Working Procedures for Appellate Review [hereinafter AB Rules].
83 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 143, at 91; AB Rule XXVII(1), reprinted in
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 232.
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issue its decisions within sixty days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal and
cannot exceed ninety days.84
C. Adoption and Implementation of Reports85
Within sixty days after the submission of a final report by a dispute
settlement panel, the DSB must adopt the report unless there is a consensus
not to adopt the report or unless a party has formally notified the DSU of its
intention to appeal the panel report.86 "An Appellate Body report shall be
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties [] within
thirty days of its circulation, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt [the report]."87 If a report finds that a measure is inconsistent with the
requirements of a covered WTO agreement, the report will recommend that
the Member concerned bring its measure into conformity with the relevant
agreement and may contain suggestions on ways that the Member concerned
can implement the report's recommendations. 88 At a meeting to be held
within thirty days after the adoption of a report, "the Member concerned
must inform the DSB of its intentions concerning the [report]
recommendations. '89 If it is not practicable for the Member concerned to
comply with the DSU's recommendations immediately, the Member
concerned shall have a "reasonable time" to do so. If such a period cannot be
agreed upon through a proposal by the Member concerned and approval by
the DSB or by agreement by the parties within forty-five days of the adoption
of a report, such a period will be determined by binding arbitration. 90
8 4 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 145; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 17.5,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 202.
85 This section is based upon Chapter 7 of PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3.
86 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 154; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 16.4,
reprinted in PALMErER & MAVRoIDIs, supra note 3, at 200.
87 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 154; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 17.14,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 202.
88 pALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 154; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 19.1,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 203.
89 PALMETrr & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 154; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.3,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 204-05.
90 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 155; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.3,
reprinted in PA.MEiER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 204-05.
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D. Remedies9'
If a Member fails to comply with the recommendations of the DSB or
otherwise fails to bring an inconsistent measure into conformity with a WTO
covered agreement within a reasonable period (as defined above), the party
that invoked the dispute settlement process can seek compensation. 92
Compensation must be mutually agreed upon by the parties and cannot be
imposed upon an unwilling party.93 If compensation cannot be agreed upon
within twenty days after the expiration of the reasonable period of time, the
complaining party can seek authorization for retaliation, i.e., where the WTO
authorizes a contracting party to suspend favorable trade concessions to
another party in retaliation for the latter's failure to bring its measure into
conformity with the WTO.9 4
Although compensation and retaliation have received a great deal of
public attention, the overarching goal of the dispute settlement process is to
bring into conformity with the WTO any measures adopted by Members that
are inconsistent with the WTO's covered agreements. As a result, the DSU
considers compensation and retaliation as necessary but temporary
measures. 95 In the fifty year history of the WTO and GATT, retaliation has
been authorized only once in a dispute when the Netherlands was authorized
to limit imports of wheat by the United States, and even in this single
instance the Netherlands never took any action.96 This case indicates that the
actual implementation of sanctions may be less significant than the important
diplomatic victory that has already been secured by the authorization of
sanctions by the WTO and GATT. Even when compensation or retaliation
has been authorized, the DSB will monitor the implementation of adopted
reports until the recommendations of the report have been adopted or the
parties have reached a settlement.97 This policy serves the overall goal of
preserving a system that all of its members value and avoids the friction or
91 This section is based upon Chapter 8 of PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3.
92 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 164; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22.1,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 206.
93 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22.2, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra
note 3, at 206.
94 Id.
95 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 167; DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22.1,
reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 206.
96 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 168.
97 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22.8, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra
note 3, at 208.
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diplomatic embarrassment that may be caused if compensation and
retaliation were implemented on a regular basis as a final settlement in the
WTO dispute settlement process. The ultimate goals of the dispute settlement
system remain conformity of the measure in question with the WTO system
and restoring any imbalance in the WTO system caused by a non-conforming
measure.
98
IV. CONCLUSION
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION is a
useful, clear text that illustrates the basic mechanics and some of the
complexities of the WTO dispute settlement process. The volume not only
provides an overview of the entire system but also goes into some depth on
the more technical aspects of dispute settlement and reflects the authors'
combined experience in both appearing before and advising GATT/WTO
dispute settlement bodies. This volume also demonstrates how the DSU and
its principle of negative consensus-that WTO reports should be adopted
unless there is a consensus not to do so-have introduced a new era of
legalism in international dispute settlement. The authors argue persuasively
that the WTO dispute settlement process is now arguably the most effective
dispute settlement process in the entire arena of public international law.99
While the authors do not stress the continuing differences between
international dispute settlement and domestic legal systems, readers should
be cautioned that there are some fundamental differences between
international dispute settlement and domestic civil litigation that do not
appear to be likely to disappear any time soon. Unlike domestic legal
systems, the WTO dispute settlement system does not contain a coercive
mechanism to compel unwilling parties to comply with an adverse report. In
a domestic legal system, such as the United States, winning parties can
invoke the coercive power of the State through the execution and
enforcement of judgments by the judicial system and through other means to
impose a judicial solution upon a recalcitrant party. In some domestic legal
systems, failure of a losing party to comply with a legal judgment may result
in a party being subject to other civil or even criminal sanctions, including
imprisonment.
No similar mechanism exists in international law, and the adoption of the
DSU and the principle of negative consensus does not alter this fundamental
difference between international dispute settlement and its counterpart in
98 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22.1, reprinted in PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra
note 3, at 206.
99 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 3, at 153.
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some domestic systems. The DSU and the principle of negative consensus,
however, does create greater institutional and political pressures to comply
with DSU reports and can result in greater diplomatic embarrassment for
those members who refuse to comply. No longer can a Member block the
establishment of a panel or the adoption of an adverse report and stall the
entire dispute settlement process. Instead, under the DSU, a Member is faced
with the diplomatic and political pressures of compliance with reports that
have received the institutional approval of the DSU and the WTO. Failure to
comply under these circumstances may call into question the Member's
respect for the entire WTO system and may risk undermining that Member's
reputation in the world trading system. Institutional pressure, the desire to
maintain the WTO system because it is of value to all of its members, and the
avoidance of diplomatic embarrassment-not fear of coercion-underlies the
motivation to comply with DSU reports. While the WTO dispute settlement
system has increased the pressures from all of these sources to comply with
DSU reports, the system remains fundamentally a system of voluntary
compliance consistent with the tradition of public international law. As a
result, there appears to be some limits on the evolution of the international
dispute settlement system in the direction of domestic civil litigation.
From the point of view of those who are likely to appear before DSU
bodies-government officials, diplomats, and lawyers-it would have been
useful if the volume had included a discussion of a greater number of the
WTO Panel and Appellate Reports that have already been adopted. Such a
discussion would be helpful to those who do not have substantial experience
with the DSU and would give a more complete picture of the dispute
settlement process. Given that there are relatively few WTO decisions since
1995, inclusion of some of the texts of these decisions in the appendix, in
addition to the agreements and treaties already collected, would also add to
the usefulness of the volume as a reference work.
A discussion of future trends might also be useful, as it appears likely
that the dispute settlement process will continue to evolve and move in new
directions. For instance, one of these trends is an increasing role for lawyers.
Dispute settlement under GATT was often done without the assistance of
attorneys but done through the work of government officials and diplomats.
An increase in a role for private lawyers appears to be one result of the
changes brought about by.the DSU-some of the documents submitted
during the dispute settlement process resemble legal briefs that may be
suitable for private attorneys to draft. Moreover, lawyers may fiave additional
roles in representing their clients during the meetings of the dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body-meetings which resemble
hearings and oral argument under domestic law. The involvement of lawyers
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may mean that WTO dispute settlement may develop an even greater affinity
with domestic civil litigation and the adversary process. Some observations
by the authors of these and other future trends in a rapidly evolving area
might have been useful to both their readers. But these are minor quibbles
with a useful volume that should find a receptive audience in this new age of
legalism for the WTO dispute settlement process.

